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Supreme Decision: Roger Taney and the Dred Scott Case 
By Mike Nicholas ‘07
I
Of all the events that pushed a divided nation closer and closer to war, none 
seemed to have the power to ignite the passions of sectionalists more than the Dred Scott 
Decision. What began as an obscure, relatively innocuous civil action in a Missouri 
district court evolved into a national battle cry for abolitionists in the North, a vindication 
of the peculiar institution for the South, and a catalyst that would ultimately bring the two 
sides to settle their dispute on the battlefield. At the center of this controversial decision 
was its principal architect and author, Chief Justice Roger B. Taney. Criticism of this 
Marylander came from those who at one time held him in the highest esteem and 
regarded him for his legal prowess, but who now despised him for what they considered 
to be his abdication of legal principle in favor of a personal bias for slavery, a corrupt 
bargain with the incoming president, and the final straw in a Southern conspiracy to 
expand slavery. In truth, however, Taney’s opinion in Dred Scot vs. Sanford reflected 
none of these sentiments, and was instead founded upon what he believed to be a sound 
theory of constitutional jurisprudence.
Roger Brooke Taney was appointed to the Supreme Court of the United States 
during the height of Andrew Jackson’s presidency. During this time, property 
qualifications for suffrage were greatly reduced, and as a result the privilege was 
extended to a far greater number of the citizenry than ever before. Consequently, the 
affairs of the national government were now influenced by laborers and frontiersmen 
alike, and when combined with the economic shift of the era (particularly in the north) 
producing an unprecedented growth in industry, state governments found themselves 
having to regulate beyond simple natural rights and into the realm of social and economic 
legislation.1
This stood in contrast to the time of Taney’s predecessor, the famed Chief Justice 
John Marshall, who along with his equally famous Marshall Court, had strictly limited 
the reach of states into the social realm and preserved the power of the federal
Smith, Charles W. R obger B. Taney: Jacksonian Jurist. P.27
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government. The age of Jackson would prove a marked shift in constitutional doctrine, 
and with Taney at the apex, the Court would swing towards allowing a strong state power 
to regulate a whole range of interests, checked only when individual rights were 
threatened against the will of the populace.2
This new doctrine manifested itself in a series of rulings giving the states broader 
authority of regulation, something the Marshall Court had been hesitant to do. Among 
them were Brown vs. Maryland, Briscoe vs Bank o f the Commonwealth o f Kentucky, and 
Charles River Bridge vs Warren River Bridge. The common threads among them were 
questions of state authority to regulate different aspects of police action and commerce by 
the states over objections of federal jurisdiction. In Brown, the Court ruled that a 
Maryland statute requiring the licensing of importers of various goods was constitutional 
because it represented a police action by the state (as opposed to a regulation of 
commerce, reserved for the federal government) and was therefore legitimate. Briscoe 
saw the Court declare constitutional that individual states could charter banks, so long as 
they did not issue separate bills of credit, and Charles River Bridge strictly construed the 
obligation of contracts clause of the federal constitution. In each of these cases, Taney 
either authored the majority opinion or concurred in the outcome, and each case 
represented an empowerment of the state governments, reversing a powerful federalist 
trend.3
Along with the doctrinal shift of the Court came a change in the personality of its 
Chief. Taney, unlike Marshall, was meticulous in avoiding direct involvement in politics, 
and even avoided the mere appearance of impropriety or participation in any part of 
deliberative political discourse. While Marshall had often debated questions of the Court 
and endorsed political candidates in newspapers, Taney did not. This is not to say that he 
had no such opinions or to suggest that he refrained from expressing them; rather the 
form of such expression was usually confined to private correspondence or public 
comment, but only in the realm of his official duties.4
Taney was, however, a strong believer in slavery, and a partisan one at that. His 
opinions in Prigg vs. Pennsylvania and Groves vs. Slaughter reflect a deep defense of the 
institution. Each case dealt with an aspect of slavery, the most notable being his dissent 
in Prigg. The Court ruled that a Pennsylvania statute prohibiting the forcible removal of 
a slave from its borders to be unconstitutional. While Taney agreed with the outcome, he 
believed (and thus dissented) that the states could aid the federal government in the 
exercise of its powers (in this case, the deliverance of fugitive slaves). His views on 
slavery were never in doubt, but neither was his commitment to jurisprudence, evidenced 
by his personal correspondence with members of both political parties and ideological 
viewpoints.5
These events and incidents in the life and era of Taney up to this point bear no 
direct or causal link to the outcome of the Dred Scott case, but they do place the 
proceedings in their proper context, and offer a window into the mind of the eventual 
author of arguably one of the most famous decisions of the 19th Century. It is within this 
backdrop that the Dred Scott case was brought before the Court for final argument on
2 Smith, Charles W. Robger B. Taney: Jacksonian Jurist. P. 28
3 Taney, Roger B; Samuel Tyler. Memoir O f  Roger Brooke Tanev. LL.D. Pp. 273-75.
4 Fehrenbacher, Don E. The Dred Scott Case: Its Significance in American Law and Politics. P. 232.
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December 15th, 1856. The narrow issue was the plight of a one Dred Scott, a figure of 
little significance prior to the decision involving his plea in abatement to have himself 
declared free, by virtue of the fact that he had resided in free territory for a number of 
years, after having previously served time as a slave. The lower courts of the state of 
Missouri agreed with him, but the Missouri Supreme Court reversed, and the case was 
filed on his behalf in the federal court system, ultimately winding its way up to the 
Supreme Court (the December 15th hearing was actually a re-argument before the Court).
On a broader and more relevant plane, the case presented three distinct questions 
for the Court to decide. First, whether or not Dred Scott was a slave, and therefore 
entitled to file suit in federal court. By extension, the Court was being asked to decide 
whether or not all Negroes themselves were considered citizens of the United States. 
Second, the Court was presented with arguments as to the status of Negroes held in free 
states, whereby slavery is prohibited. The central question of this point was were they 
free by virtue of residency in a free state, and by extension, was the “property” of the 
slave owner forfeit upon entrance to a free state? Third, the Court was asked to consider 
the constitutionality of federal legislation regulating slavery in the territories.
Specifically called into question here was the Missouri Compromise, ensuring no 
territory above thirty degrees thirty minutes would permit slavery, and the Kansas- 
Nebraska Act which formalized the doctrine of popular sovereignty—having the issue 
decided by ballot referendum. The Court, through Taney, ultimately decided that Dred 
Scott (and by extension, all slaves and former slaves) was not a citizen, that residency in 
a free state did not deprive an owner of his property (including slaves), and that federal 
legislation to the contrary was unconstitutional. While a superficial overview seems 
simple enough, a deeper analysis into the actual deliberations of Taney and the Court, 
along with the rationale behind the decision reveal a nearly unprecedented complex web 
of legal intricacy.
That the first issue was to be decided by the Court was never in doubt, for the 
question of citizenship was a clear and obvious starting point for the case. Taney phrased 
the question of Negro citizenship (Scott’s) in the form of asking “whether the 
descendants of such slaves, when they shall be emancipated, or who are bom of parents 
who had become free before their birth, are citizens of a State, in the sense in which the 
word is used in the Constitution of the United States.”6
In answering this question, Taney posited during deliberation that the Constitution 
specifically formed various classes of people. The Constitution gave Congress specific 
authority to naturalize Native Indians, and defined the body politic as “the people of the 
United States,” which he then interpreted to be citizens. At no point in the history of the 
nation had Negroes been considered citizens of equal stature to whites, and in fact were 
considered “a subordinate and inferior class of being...and had no rights and privileges 
but such as those who held the power and the government might choose to grant them.”7
It is important to note at this juncture that Taney considered the foregoing to be 
the rule of law at the time of the framing of the Constitution, and he noted as such not 
only in deliberations, but also in his writings, where he traced the institution from 
Aristotle, who believed wholly in the order of nature (hence the “subordinate class of 
being”), to the rise of Christianity, which in fact accepted it as a legal institution and only
6 Hopkin, V.G. Dred Scott’s Case. P. 62-63
7 Hopkin, V.G. Dred Scott’s Case. P 63
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sought to regulate relations between master and slave, not dissolve the relationship 
completely. Finally, Taney referenced the writings of his predecessor in 1825, when 
John Marshall wrote that “ ....the world has agreed that it [slavery] is a legitimate use of 
force.. .by general consent” and therefore authorized by the law of nations. Taney rested 
on the belief that the Framers had considered their own view of the legality and justness 
of the issue of slavery and citizenship, and had decided the question in the form of the 
Constitution, and therefore slaves, even former slaves, in keeping with long standing 
legal tradition as well as the Constitution, were not to be considered citizens of the United 
States.8
While this was sufficient for the federal question of jurisdiction, discrepancy 
remained as to whether or not a slave or freed slave was a citizen of a particular state.
This question, according to Taney, still did not give Scott standing to sue, because even if 
a state conferred citizenship upon him, it would not carry the force of law outside of the 
state, and the state itself would be prohibited to “introduce a new member into the 
political community created by the Constitution of the United States.” Therefore, Dred 
Scott was not a citizen, and had no standing to sue for relief in federal court.9
While contemporary abolitionists argued that slavery was a reprehensible evil and 
that freed slaves should be treated as citizens of the United States, at least in terms of the 
right to file suit (although not necessarily equal to that of whites), Taney’s deliberations 
were restricted to the study of history, precedent, and the standing law as to decide 
question of citizenship. The government and the people of the United States had the 
authority, in Taney’s view, to re-define the law through constitutional amendment, but 
while this was proposed, it never came to fruition, and thus the supreme law of the land 
was one in favor of denying citizenship to former slaves. Further justification lay in 
Taney’s belief that “each age fixes the standard of right and wrong, of legality and 
illegality for itself; and all rights.. .duties.. .and obligations descend to the next age, 
binding it just as they bound the previous age” unless the standard itself is altered. The 
Framers had spoken, the people had spoken (if through a lack of action to alter the status 
quo rather than through a direct affirmation of the institution), and therefore precedent 
bound the current generation.10
This is the juncture of the case that received the most criticism, the fact that Taney 
proceeded to consider the remaining two points of the case (whether or not Negroes could 
be free by virtue of residency in a free state and the constitutionality of federal laws to the 
contrary). The question Taney was forced to answer was whether or not further 
consideration of the case beyond the dispute of standing was to be considered obiter dicta 
of the Court, or binding precedent upon questions of legal error. Taney concluded for the 
latter, citing three distinct points. First, there was a subtle (yet important difference) 
between the nature of a writ of error in state court and a writ of error in federal court.
The latter required that the entire body of evidence be presented to the appellate body. 
Therefore, the Supreme Court had the complete record of the case, and was duty bound to 
correct any errors it saw in the application of federal law (and the Constitution) made by 
lower courts. Second, the resolution of one error did not automatically prohibit further 
consideration of any remaining errors to be found in the record. To the contrary, Taney
8 Taney, Roger B; Samuel Tyler. Memoir O f Roger Brooke Tanev. LL.D. P p 370-71
9 Hopkin, V.G. Dred Scott’s Case. P 63-64
10 Taney, Roger B; Samuel Tyler. Memoir O f Roger Brooke Tanev. LL.D, Pp 344-4 5 ;  372-373
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argued that a failure to do so would de facto permit the same misconstruction/application 
of federal law in the future. Finally, Taney found the need to resolve further error in the 
Dred Scott case, specifically to address points raised during argument by both counsel 
that were in error of federal law.11
With that as the logical framework for continuing, consideration of the remaining 
two points of the case was not in fact obiter dicta, but rather a ruling on the merits of the 
case as a whole presented before the Court. To address these issues Taney framed the 
following questions: “Were the Scotts free by reason of their stay in the territory? If they 
were not, was Dred Scott himself free by reason of his sojourn to Illinois?” The answer 
to the first question posed by Taney would also answer the third part of the overall case 
(whether or not federal regulation prohibiting slaves from entering and remaining in 
slavery between certain states was constitutional), while the answer to the second 
question just posed by Taney would satisfy the second part of the overall case (whether 
or not Dred Scott was free by virtue of his stay in a free state). The two answers would 
have to be inexorably linked, or else be in a self-defeating form of contradiction.12
As to the question of Dred Scott’s freedom, his counsel had argued that the eighth 
section of the Missouri Compromise Act of 1820 prohibited slavery beyond the thirty 
degrees thirty minutes line, and therefore Dred Scott was free by virtue of this Act. In 
support, counsel cited Congress’ expressed authority under the Constitution to “dispose 
of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property 
belonging to the United States.” Taney made two key distinctions; first he gave a long 
historical treatise designed to give the clause proper context and meaning at the time in 
which it was written. Second, and more importantly, Taney distinguished between the 
property “belonging to the United States” and private property held by the individual. 
Both rights needed to be guarded with equal care, and as such Congress could not 
“infringe upon the rights of persons or the rights of property of the citizen.” These were 
specifically enumerated in the Constitution, particularly the Fifth Amendment, which 
held that no person could be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of 
law. This protection trumped the authority of Congress to regulate property belonging to 
it (the territories). As a result, the eighth section of the Missouri Compromise Act of 
1820 was void, for “an Act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States or 
his liberty or property merely because he came himself or brought his property into a 
particular territory of the U.S. and who had committed no offence against it could hardly 
be dignified as due process of law.”13
The Scotts then were not free because of that provision, and further, the crux of 
the Missouri Compromise was invalid prima facie, for it automatically deprived citizens 
of their property simply upon geographical movement. The only remaining question to 
consider was whether or not Dred Scott was free by virtue of his sojourn to Illinois, and 
on this question Taney deferred in large part to the judgment of the Supreme Court of 
Missouri, which ruled that he was in fact still property. At that point, the foregoing 
portions of the opinion controlled, and Dred Scott was neither a citizen (the first 
question), free (the second), and any federal legislation to the contrary of the first and
11 Hopkin, V.G. Dred Scott’s Case. P 65-66
12 Hopkin, V.G. Dred Scott’s Case. P 66
13 Hopkin, V.G. Dred Scott’s Case. P 70-71
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second points with regards to slaves as property was void via the Fifth Amendment (the 
final point).
Almost immediately after Chief Justice Taney read his opinion from the bench, an 
outpouring of sharp and biting criticism surrounded the justice. Accusations took on 
three major forms, first that his judicial opinion was a reflection of his own views of 
slavery rather than grounded in actual law, second that he had colluded with incoming 
president Buchanan, and finally that his opinion was that of a Southerner who was part of 
a conspiracy to expand slavery throughout the Union. The first point can nearly be 
dismissed on its face; Taney’s written opinion, his deliberations, and his correspondence 
indicate that his decision was grounded in a belief of the law. While many did and may 
still disagree with the conclusions drawn from his particular analysis, there is little 
evidence to suggest that Taney disregarded legal precedent in favor of his own personal 
opinion. Belief in such a notion would render a long historical account of constitutional 
provisions, a reflection on the origins of the legitimacy of slavery and a general refraining 
from active politicking from the bench wholly unnecessary, yet Taney performed all 
three throughout the case.14
The second point was far more serious and was articulated in a much more 
effective manner than the first. William Seward, a Senator from New York, immediately 
criticized the decision, being among the first, and certainly among the most vociferous to 
proclaim it to be obiter dicta and thus non-binding. But Taney had already addressed 
these objections, and thus the thrust of the attack came against his character. Seward first 
offered a scathing attack on President Buchanan, and then alleged that upon his election 
the Supreme Court and Taney approached him personally and made him aware of the 
case. Furthermore, he alleged that the Court was prepared to simply dismiss the case for 
want of jurisdiction (a conclusion that could have been reached after a finding that Dred 
Scott was not a citizen) but instead Taney desired to offer a plum to the new president, 
and therefore seized the opportunity to declare the Missouri compromise 
unconstitutional, solidify the principle of slaves as property, and as such force slavery 
throughout the United States “paramount to any popular sovereignty [(a reference to the 
Kansas-Nebraska Act, which was also Constitutionally suspect after the decision)] within 
the territories, and even to the authority of Congress itself.” In so doing, the Court 
forfeited its dignity, unto which it had always held.15
The most powerful evidence against such claims of collusion came from letters of 
correspondence between two other justices, S. Nelson and J.A. Campbell, who heard the 
case, and Samuel Tyler, co-author of Taney’s Memoirs. In each letter, the accusations 
are deemed “calumnious and spiteful,” and a review of both the case and the actions of 
the Chief Justice were included. In both letters, Taney is seen neither communicating 
with Buchanan concerning the case, nor preparing any opinion or deliberation with 
anyone other than his fellow justices.16
Evidence of actual collusion is lacking not only because of the letters to the 
contrary, but also because of the lack of evidence of outside thought during Taney’s 
deliberations with his fellow justices. Taney very well may have communicated with
14 Taney, Roger B; Samuel Tyler. Memoir O f Roger Brooke Tanev. LL.D. P 373
15 Taney, Roger B; Samuel Tyler. Memoir O f Roger Brooke Tanev. LI..D. P 376
16 Taney, Roger B; Samuel Tyler. “Various Correspondence.” Memoir O f Roger Brooke Taney. LL.D. Pd 
384
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President Buchanan, and may have even allowed him to see an advance copy of the 
opinion, but the heart of Seward’s claim is that there was a form of corrupt bargaining 
between Taney and Buchanan, and no such direct evidence is in support of it. More than 
likely, Seward was dissatisfied with the outcome to the point where he would place 
Taney in the center of what he and many other Northerner’s believed to be a Southern 
conspiracy against the anti-slavery movement.
Thus the third point of criticism’s veracity (that of Taney being a part of that 
conspiracy by virtue of being a Southerner in support of the institution) is the most 
difficult to determine. Almost immediately, he was absolved from this charge by 
newspapers, with the Cincinnati Enquirer condemning the attacks against him saying 
“Mr. Taney personally is opposed to slavery in principle and practice. The position he 
took was the result of a mistaken sense of duty and not of any partiality for slavery.” 
Historians throughout history have furthered this view by arguing that Taney favored 
gradual emancipation, that slavery was against his conscience and that in truth he was an 
abolitionist at heart.17
Yet these sentiments, while endearing to the Chief Justice, in fact deny his record 
prior to the case. As discussed beforehand, he favored allowing the states themselves to 
choose their own courses of actions on numerous questions of economic and social 
liberty. This would go starkly against the abolitionist stance that slavery should be 
abolished by edict of the federal government. Even his written opinions, especially Prigg 
and Groves, reflected a very strong sentiment in favor of slavery and in the preservation 
of the institution. To deny that Taney was in fact a Southern gentleman is to deny the 
reality of who sat at the head of the Court. Up until just before the Dred Scott decision, 
Taney had become vehement and even partisan in his defense of slavery, but always 
within the bounds of the law afforded to him.18
Thus it is not a contradiction to say that Taney personally favored slavery but did 
not substitute his own passionate belief for it in place of the law. Rather, Taney believed 
that the law did in fact support his beliefs, and a critical analysis of the standing law and 
precedent of the time would tend to indicate that the notion of abolition in the Untied 
States was the radical option at the time, whereas the status quo was a maintenance of 
slavery as determined by the will of the individual states, the same state authority that 
Taney supported, especially when juxtaposed to Marshall. Thus the opinion written by 
Taney was founded upon tested legal grounds that went against the growing grain of the 
North, and ultimately would be meted out on the fields of battle.
As to the question of whether or not Taney’s opinion served as the principal 
catalyst for the Civil War, a reasoned analysis would reveal that it certainly participated 
in the process, but was not in and of itself overtly responsible. The decision itself was 
both highly formal and emotional in its delivery, and certainly contributed to growing 
sectional animosity. Yet other important events would occur post-Dred Scott, including 
the raid on Harper’s Ferry and the publishing of Uncle Tom's Cabin, which was without a 
doubt read by many more citizens than Taney’s opinion was. In the end, the relationship
17 Fehrenbacher, Don E. The Dred Scott Case: Its Significance in American Law and Politics. P 560
Quoted from subsection marked with *
18 Fehrenbacher, Don E. The Dred Scott Case: Its Significance in American Law and Politics. P 560
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between Roger Taney’s Dred Scott opinion and the start of the civil war is contributory, 
but not necessarily causal.19
Thus despite claims to the contrary, a careful analysis of Roger Taney reveals a 
Southern man, believing in slavery, but believing above all in the rule of law. Taney 
believed that the Constitution as written, combined with the history, precedent, and status 
quo of the nation, supported the institution of slavery. Thus in Dred Scott’s case it was a 
simple logical progression that led to the decision. Slaves were property. Dred Scott, 
being a slave, was property. Also as a condition of slavery, he was not a citizen, and 
therefore could not sue. Further, property could not be denied without due process of 
law, something geographical movement did not raze, and finally, attempts at federal 
legislation in contradiction of these points were to be held void. Roger Taney’s Opinion 
of the Court was thus a product of reasoned jurisprudence; open to disagreement, but not 
to be reduced to mere personal preference of the author.
19 Fehrenbacher, Don E. The Dred Scott Case: Its Significance in American Law and Politics. P 562
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